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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PEARL H. STEFFENSEN, j 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
SMITHfS MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i Case No. 
i Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen presents the 
following questions for review: 
I. Did the court of appeals erroneously apply a harmless 
error analysis after it determined that the trial court committed 
error by directing a verdict in favor of Defendant/Respondent 
Smith's Management Corporation ("Smith's")? 
A. Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the 
appellate court holds that the directed verdict was erroneously 
granted by the trial court? 
B. Even if a harmless error analysis is appropriate 
in such circumstances, is such an analysis appropriate in this 
case? 
1 
II. Did the court of appeals erroneously classify 
foreseeability and overrule a Utah Supreme Court case in holding 
that jury Instruction No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was 
harmless? 
III. Did the court of appeals erroneously affirm the 
exclusion of evidence in contravention of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and Utah Supreme Court case law? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals1 opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), was 
issued on October 29, 1991. (Addendum A). Mrs. Steffensen's 
petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991, and the 
denial was filed on November 20, 1991. (Addendum B). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) which grants the Utah 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the 
court of appeals11. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules pertinent to the questions presented for review is 
contained in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, Pearl H. Steffensen, an eighty-two year old 
woman, was seriously injured while shopping at a Smith's store 
located at 2100 South and 900 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
2 
1242 at 5-6). The pertinent facts are set forth in the court 
appeals' opinion except that the court's statement concerning 
number of employees involved in the collision is inaccurate: 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered a 
Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and cigarettes. 
Gary Canham, the store's front-end manager, observed 
Mr. Burnett take beer and cigarettes from the store's 
shelves. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the front of the 
store, Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might attempt 
to leave the store without paying for the merchandise. 
Mr. Canham immediately informed Paul Rompus, Smith's 
Drug King manager, and together the two watched Mr. 
Burnett from the office area at the front of the store. 
As Mr. Burnett walked toward the front of the store, he 
noticed the two managers and felt they were watching 
him. Accordingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-
out stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no 
longer being watched, he got out of line and walked 
quickly toward the door with the merchandise. 
The two managers then confronted Mr. Burnett and 
asked him to come with them to their office. As the 
three walked toward the office, Mr. Rompus called out 
to another employee at the front of the store, telling 
her to call the police. As the group reached the 
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke" toward the 
exit, dropping the beer and cigarettes as he ran. Mr. 
Rompus yelled "stop him - see if you can stop him" in 
an effort to engage the assistance of others. 
Responding to the call for help, another employee 
attempted to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football 
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett dodged this 
employee, turning in a different direction, and as he 
did so, ran directly into another employee. Mr. 
Burnett "bounced" off this employee directly into the 
plaintiff, Mrs. Steffensen, who was standing at the 
customer service counter writing a check. [Actually, 
Mr. Burnett ricocheted off the employee who had assumed 
the football stance rather than another employee. (T. 
196)] The force of the collision knocked Mrs. 
Steffensen to the ground, where she struck her head on 
the tile floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the 
hospital and has since suffered severe "stroke-like" 
paralysis to the entire left side of her body. 
172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. 
Mrs. Steffensen commenced this action against Smith's 
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alleging that Smith's negligence was the cause of her injuries• 
Among other things, Mrs. Steffensen alleged that Smith's failed 
to properly train its employees to deal with shoplifters; that 
Smith's employees violated Smith's policies before apprehending 
Mr. Burnett by failing to deter him; and that Smith's employees 
violated Smith's policies by chasing and attempting to stop Mr. 
Burnett after he ran from them. After presentation of all the 
evidence, Smith's counsel moved for a partial directed verdict on 
the grounds that Smith's failure to adequately train its 
employees and to deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not be 
the proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial 
judge granted Smith's motion. (R. 1216). The jury found that 
Smith's had acted negligently but that the negligence was not the 
proximate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. (R. 1155) 
Mrs. Steffensen appealed to the court of appeals claiming: 
(1) the trial court improperly granted the partial directed 
verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
32 which required the jury to find that Smith's employees must be 
able to specifically predict Mr. Burnett's actions in order to 
find that Smith's actions caused Mrs. Steffensen's injuries, and 
(3) that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony 
regarding Smith's training practices and the apportionment of 
fault between Smith's and Mr. Burnett. The court of appeals held 
that the trial court committed error in granting the partial 
directed verdict. However, the court of appeals then applied a 
harmless error analysis and held that the trial court's error was 
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harmless. Id. The court of appeals also held that Instruction 
No. 32 was erroneous but that the error was harmless. 172 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 40. Finally, the court of appeals held the 
exclusion of expert testimony on employee training was harmless 
error and that the exclusion of testimony on the apportionment of 
fault was proper. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
AFTER DETERMINING THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
GRANTED SMITHS MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
When the court of appeals applied a harmless error analysis 
after determining that the trial court erroneously granted the 
motion for a partial directed verdict, it decided an important 
question of state law not previously considered by this Court and 
it decided a question of state law in a way that conflicts with 
dozens of cases decided by this Court over a period of decades. 
Utah R. App. P. 46(b) & (d). Because of the import of the court 
of appeals' unprecedented action and its potential impact on 
numerous cases beyond this case, the Supreme Court should review 
the actions of the court of appeals. 
On appeal Mrs. Steffensen asserted that the trial court 
improperly granted a partially directed verdict on the element of 
proximate cause in favor of Smith1s. Mrs. Steffensen alleged 
that Smith's had been negligent in failing to properly train its 
employees to deter a shoplifter. Smith's employees manual 
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advocated deterrence techniques. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, 41 n. 
4. Further, Mrs. Steffensen claimed that Smith's failed to train 
its employees and to implement procedures to properly handle a 
shoplifter once a decision to apprehend was made. The company 
manuals contained policies of restraint in such situations. 172 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 37, 41 n. 4. The trial court granted Smith's 
motion for a partial directed verdict, ruling as a matter of law 
that Smith's "actions that took place prior to the time that the 
shoplifter was detained" could not be the proximate cause of Mrs. 
Steffensen's injury. (Addendum C at 7). The jury was then 
instructed that none of Smith's conduct before the stop of the 
shoplifter could be considered the proximate cause of Mrs. 
Steffensen's injuries. 
The court of appeals held that the trial court's ruling on 
the motion for partial directed verdict was erroneous and 
declared: 
There was probably sufficient evidence 
produced from which a reasonable juror could 
infer that Smith's failure to deter was a 
negligent act, as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
trained employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer's injury. 
Steffensen, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39 (footnote omitted). 
However, after reaching this conclusion, the court applied a 
harmless error analysis and determined that the trial court's 
error had been harmless. 
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A. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED A 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS TO A PARTIAL DIRECTED 
VERDICT WHICH HAD BEEN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
When the court of appeals held that the trial court 
erroneously granted a directed verdict, its subsequent 
application of a harmless error analysis was inconsistent with 
the required standard of review in such cases as previously 
applied by this Court. A directed verdict is only appropriate 
when a trial court is able to conclude that reasonable minds 
would not differ on the facts from the evidence presented. 
Management Comm. v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P. 2d 896, 897-98 
(Utah 1982). Furthermore, in making its determination the trial 
court is required to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the directed verdict is 
sought. Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270 (Utah 1980). An 
appellate court reviewing a directed verdict must apply the same 
standard as the trial court. Management Comm., 652 P.2d at 898; 
Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 611 
(Utah 1982). Therefore, if the appellate court finds that there 
was a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences drawn 
therefrom that would allow reasonable minds to differ on the 
facts determined from the evidence and that would support a 
verdict in favor of the losing party, "the directed verdict 
cannot be sustained." Management Comm,, 652 P.2d at 898. 
A trial court is prohibited from considering the weight of 
the evidence in passing on a motion for directed verdict, 
Cerritos Trucking Co., 645 P.2d at 613, and the standard of 
7 
review imposes the same limitation on the appellate court. The 
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
jury. By holding that the trial court erred in granting a 
directed verdict, the appellate court has concluded that 
reasonable minds could differ on the facts from the evidence 
presented and that a verdict could have been entered for the 
losing party. 
In contrast, this Court has stated that harmless errors are 
"errors which, although properly preserved below and presented on 
appeal, are sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there 
is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989) . When an appellate court holds that reasonable minds 
could differ on the evidence and a verdict could have been 
entered for the losing party, as the court of appeals did in this 
case, the appellate court is admitting that the error is not 
inconsequential and that there is a "reasonable likelihood that 
the error affected the outcome." The required basis for a 
finding of error is simply incompatible with a harmless error 
analysis. Entertaining a harmless error analysis in such a 
situation would be similar to considering a harmless error 
analysis in the case of an erroneously granted summary judgment; 
State v. Verde is the case cited by the court of appeals 
to justify its harmless error analysis. However, Verde is not a 
civil case and does not involve a directed verdict. The quotation 
cited in the text and relied on by the court of appeals was part 
of a longer discourse on the meaning of the term "manifest 
injustice" under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(c). 
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the required standard of review is inconsistent with a finding of 
harmless error. 
A review of 40 years of cases from the Utah Supreme Court 
reveals that the Court has never held an erroneously granted 
directed verdict to be harmless error.2 Cases of erroneously 
granted directed verdicts are reversed and remanded. See e.g., 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 
1989); Whitaker v. Nichols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 1985); Acculog, 
Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 
P.2d 723 (Utah 1983); Management Committee v. Greystone Pines, 
Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982); Little America Refining Co. v. 
Levba, 641 P.2d 112 (Utah 1982); Seecrmiller v. KSL, Inc.. 626 
P.2d 968 (Utah 1981). 
One commentator has noted the inapplicability of the 
harmless error standard to an erroneously granted directed 
verdict: 
Whenever the appellant introduces sufficient 
evidence to take his case to the jury, there 
exists the possibility that the jury might 
have found a verdict for him, had the error 
not intervened. Hence, in such a situation 
it would seem impossible for an appellate 
court to determine definitely that the 
verdict for the respondent was unaffected by 
the erroneous matter . . . 
Only with such a standard as that set out 
above or to phrase it differently, 
disregarding the matter complained of, no 
reasonable jury could have come to any other 
verdict, can the appellate court validly 
assert that it is not usurping the function 
The forty year period cited is an artificial limit 
imposed by Petitioner's counsel and has no significance. 
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of the jury. For, unless the weight of the 
evidence is so overwhelming, no conclusive 
determination can be made as to the effect of 
the error on the verdict. The determination 
becomes rather that the verdict was not 
incorrect in spite of the error. Appellate 
courts that say this put themselves in the 
jury box. 
Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 450, 
458-59 (1947). 
In this case the novel action of the court of appeals 
usurped the jury's function and effectively violated Mrs. 
Steffensen's right to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh 
amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I section 
10 of the Utah Constitution. The usurpation occurred despite the 
court's statement that a reasonable juror could have found for 
Mrs. Steffensen. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. Because this is an 
issue of first impression with a large potential impact, this 
Court should review the issue. 
B. EVEN IF A HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS IS APPROPRIATE 
IN A CASE OF AN ERRONEOUSLY DIRECTED VERDICT, THE 
ERROR IN THIS CASE WAS NOT HARMLESS. 
In its opinion in this case, the court of appeals stated 
that Mrs. Steffensen introduced "substantial expert testimony" 
that deterrence prevents shoplifting and thus "promote[s] 
customer safety." 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. Furthermore, the 
court noted that "the experts testified that a retail store 
should also train its employees to use care when apprehending a 
shoplifter." 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. These factors led to the 
court's conclusion that the trial court's ruling was incorrect 
10 
and that there was "probably sufficient evidence produced from 
which a reasonable juror could infer that Smith's failure to 
deter was a negligent act" and that "it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately trained employee" that 
the decision to chase a shoplifter in a crowded store could lead 
to the injury of a customer. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
(emphasis added) 
The court of appeals justified the error as harmless because 
the jury found that Smith's negligence was not the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries and the court of appeals 
concluded that the jury would not have changed its verdict on 
proximate cause. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. However, the court 
of appeals' conclusion is erroneous. The trial court, after 
granting Smith's motion for a partial directed verdict, 
instructed the jury that Smith's conduct prior to the stop of the 
shoplifter could not be considered: 
You have heard testimony regarding events 
that occurred prior to the time of the stop 
of the shoplifter, Mr. Burnett. You are 
instructed that none of the actions by 
Smith's employees prior to the stop and 
detention proximately caused plaintiff's 
injuries. Therefore, you must not take this 
testimony into consideration when 
deliberating and making your decision. 
This instruction eliminated all evidence concerning the 
value of deterrence in reducing shoplifting, all evidence 
concerning specific deterrence of the shoplifter in this case, 
all evidence concerning Smith's employees' knowledge of the store 
policy to let fleeing shoplifters escape, and all evidence 
11 
concerning training of employees not to yell "stop him - see if 
you can stop him." The jury could have concluded from any or all 
of the excluded evidence that there was a reasonable connection 
between Smith's acts or omissions and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. 
See e.g., W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, §41 at 266 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
In each instance cited, Smith's conduct could reasonably be 
seen as the cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. For example, if 
Smith's employees had continued the specific deterrence of Mr. 
Burnett which forced him to stand in a check out line, he 
ultimately would have been forced to either purchase the items or 
leave them and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not have 
occurred. Similarly, if Smith's employees had adequate knowledge 
to allow fleeing shoplifters to escape, as per store policy, Mr. 
Rompus would not have chased Mr. Burnett and yelled for other 
employees to stop him and Mrs. Steffensen's injuries would not 
have occurred. If employees had been trained to allow fleeing 
shoplifters to escape, the store employee who assumed the 
football stance may not have done so and Mrs. Steffensen's 
injuries would not have occurred. Thus, in each instance, the 
jury could have found Smith's conduct to be the proximate cause 
of the injuries. The court of appeals' conclusion to the 
contrary is unsupported and should be reversed. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS SUB SILENTIO OVERRULED A UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CASE IN ITS DECISION CONCERNING INSTRUCTION NO. 32. 
GIVING THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT HARMLESS ERROR. 
Mrs. Steffensen claimed on appeal that the trial court 
incorrectly instructed the jury on the issue of foreseeability. 
The trial court gave the following instruction: 
Foreseeability in these instructions means 
injury or harm, if any, to a customer which 
the defendant and its employees could have 
reasonable anticipated as the natural 
consequences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anticipate the 
particular injury which did occur. 
In determining what is foreseeable you must 
determine that the actions of Bradley Burnett 
were predictable by Smith's employees and not 
just a mere possibility. 
On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that the instruction at 
issue, Instruction No. 32, was erroneous. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
40 (Instruction No. 32 is found in Addendum C). However, the 
court applied a harmless error analysis and concluded that any 
error in the instruction was harmless because "[t]he question of 
foreseeability goes to the issue of negligence, and the jury 
found Smith negligent." 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. 
While the court was theoretically correct in stating that 
foreseeability is related to negligence, the issue is not quite 
so clear. For example, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a 
connection between foreseeability and both negligence and 
proximate cause. In Rees v. Albertsonfs, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 
133 (Utah 1978), the Court stated: "What is necessary to meet 
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the test of negligence and proximate cause is that it be 
reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would 
occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of 
the same general nature." (emphasis added) In its opinion in 
this case, the court of appeals effectively overruled that 
portion of Rees. 
Support exists for the Rees position because foreseeability 
may be relevant to both proximate cause and negligence. See, 
e.g., W. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, §43 at 298 (5th ed. 
1984) ("foreseeability in proximate cause means the same thing as 
in negligence; . . . the same considerations that determine the 
original culpability are to be used again to determine liability 
for consequences."); 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, The Law of 
Torts, § 20.5 at 163 (2d ed. 1986) ("Foreseeability does not mean 
the precise hazard or exact consequences that were encountered 
should have been foreseen. Upon this all are agreed whether they 
regard foreseeability as relevant only to the duty issue, or to 
questions of proximate cause as well.") See generally Green, 
Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961). 
Even the Restatement of Torts includes foreseeability in its 
proximate cause sections. See 4 F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray, 
The Law of Torts, §20.5 at 168 (2d ed 1986) ("The formula chosen 
by the Restatement in its section on proximate cause, with its 
emphasis on what seems to be 'extraordinary1 in the light of 
hindsight seems to abandon the foreseeability test. But careful 
analysis shows that it does not.") 
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Because of the confusion which surrounds the place of 
foreseeability in the law of torts, the court of appeals' 
statement that the error in this case was harmless because 
foreseeability concerns only negligence would be accurate only if 
the jury was adequately instructed on the meanings of negligence 
and proximate cause. The instructions in this case do not 
clarify the concepts enough for the jury to adequately 
distinguish between the two. Therefore, the error in Instruction 
No. 32, which Smith's characterizes as "unfortunate" could not be 
termed harmless. 
The quotation from Harper, James & Gray cited above 
highlights the error in Instruction No. 32; the instruction 
erroneously requires the jury to find that Smith's could 
specifically predict the behavior of Mr. Burnett. When this 
instruction was coupled with the trial court's erroneous directed 
verdict, the jury was constrained to find Smith's did not 
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. Viewed together 
the instructions predict the verdict and deprived Mrs. Steffensen 
of her right to have the jury decide the facts of the case. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS MISINTERPRETED RULE 704 OF THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE AND IGNORED UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW IN 
UPHOLDING THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE. 
Mrs. Steffensen asserted on appeal that the trial judge 
improperly excluded portions of her experts' testimony. 
Specifically, the trial court refused to allow the experts to 
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testify concerning employee training in techniques of deterring 
shoplifters. The trial court also excluded testimony from an 
expert which would have apportioned fault between the shoplifter 
and Smiths employees. The court of appeals found that the error 
in exclusion of testimony on employee training was harmless 
because of its resolution of the proximate cause issue. However, 
if this Court finds that a harmless error analysis was 
inappropriate on the proximate cause issue then the issue of the 
exclusion of expert testimony on training must be reevaluated. 
The court of appeals found that the expert testimony 
concerning the apportionment of fault was properly excluded 
because it constituted a "legal conclusion" which could not be 
rendered by an expert. However, the court did not define the 
term "legal conclusion" in its opinion. The court of appeals 
ignored a recent opinion of the Utah Supreme Court concerning 
Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which allows opinion 
evidence even if the opinion "embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact." A fair reading of the Utah 
Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Span, 170 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 16, 26, n. 1 (Utah 1991), indicates that the Supreme Court 
is willing to give a very broad interpretation to Rule 704. In 
Span, in which the only evidence that a fire was a criminal act 
was the opinion testimony of one of the fire investigators, the 
only limitation imposed on Rule 704 testimony by the Supreme 
Court was that the expert testimony "assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Id. 
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The court of appeals constructed a far narrower interpretation of 
Rule 704 in its opinion in this case. Span and this case leave 
trial courts and practitioners with conflicting interpretations 
of Rule 704. The conflict should be resolved by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this i^  day of December, 1991, 
<ULJC 
Richard B. McKeown 
C^iscu^u C. /Ljz-^eJ--
Curtis C. Nesse 
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Christopher A. Tolboe 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a 
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen 
was injured in defendant Smith's Management 
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a 
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's 
management. The jury found Smith was neg-
ligent, but the negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On 
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court 
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train 
its employees as to the appropriate methods to 
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting 
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged 
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3) 
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered 
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and 
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's front-
end manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer 
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr. 
Burnett walked toward the front of the store, 
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might 
attempt to leave the store without paying for 
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately 
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King 
manager, and together the two watched Mr. 
Burnett from the office area at the front of 
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the 
front of the store, he noticed the two mana-
gers and felt they were watching him. Accor-
dingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out 
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no 
longer being watched, he got out of line and 
walked quickly toward the door with the 
merchandise. 
The two managers then confronted Mr. 
Burnett and asked him to come with them to 
their office. As the three walked toward the 
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another 
employee at the front of the store, telling her 
to call the police. As the group reached the 
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke* 
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigar-
ettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-
-see if you can stop him," in an effort to 
engage the assistance of others. Responding to 
the call for help, another employee attempted 
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football 
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett 
dodged this employee, turning in a different 
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into 
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced* off 
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs. 
I Steffensen, who was standing at the customer 
service counter writing a check. The force of 
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the 
ground, where she struck her head on the tile 
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hos-
pital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her 
body 
Subsequently, Mrs Steffensen commenced 
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was 
negligent in dealing with Mr Burnett and that 
this negligence caused her injury At the con 
elusion of the presentation of evidence, 
defense counsel moved for a partial directed 
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to 
deter Mr Burnett from shoplifting could not, 
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of 
Mrs Steffensen's injuries The trial judge 
granted the motion and incorporated this 
ruling in his instructions to the jury At the 
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted 
written interrogatories to the jury After deli 
beration the jury found Smith had acted 
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not 
proximately cause Mrs Steffensen's injury 
I PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Mrs Steffensen's first claim of error is the 
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial 
directed verdict on the element of proximate 
causation During the trial, Mrs Steffensen 
proceeded on two theories of negligence First, 
Mrs Steffensen asserted Smith had been 
negligent in failing to train its employees to 
use techniques to "deter" Mr Burnett from 
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's 
employees negligently failed to utilize these 
techniques in dealing with Mr Burnett 
Second, Mrs Steffensen claimed Smith was 
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop 
Mr Burnett after he broke away and ran 
Mrs Steffensen argued that both of these acts 
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's 
customers and ultimately caused her injuries 
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the 
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling 
that as a matter of law, even if its employees 
had been inadequately trained about the need 
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence, 
such failure was not the proximate cause of 
Mrs Steffensen's injury The trial court 
granted Smith's request and instructed the 
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop 
and detention of Mr Burnett should not be 
considered by the jury ! 
You have heard testimony regarding 
events that occurred prior to the 
time of the stop of the shoplifter, 
Mr Burnett 
You are instructed that none of the 
actions of the Smith's employees 
prior to the stop and detention 
proximately caused plaintiffs inj 
unes Therefore, you must not take 
this testimony into consideration 
when deliberating and making your 
decision 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the court is able to conclude that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be 
Management Corp . 
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determined from the evidence presented 
Management Comm v Graystone Pines, Inc , 
652 P 2d 8%, 897 98 (Utah 1982) A directed 
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evi 
dence in a light most favorable to the losing 
party, "there is a reasonable basis in (he evi 
dence and in the inferences to be drawn ther 
efrom that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor " Id at 898, see Penrod 
v Carter, 737 P 2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987) 
Mrs Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury 
instruction concerning pre apprehension 
evidence was improper because reasonable 
minds could differ as to whether a failure to 
"deter" Mr Burnett from shoplifting was the 
proximate cause of her injuries 
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the 
plaintiff to establish four elements that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that 
defendant breached the duty (negligence), that 
the breach of the duty was the proximate 
cause of plaintiffs injury, and that there was 
in fact injury Reeves v Gentile, 813 P 2d 
111, 116 (Utah 1991) Proximate cause is "that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequ 
ence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred It is the 
efficient cause the one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury " State v Lawson, 688 P 2d 479, 482 & 
n 2 (Utah 1984) Further, there can be more 
than one proximate cause of an injury so long 
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in 
causing the injury See Anderson v Parson 
Red-E-Mix Paving Co , 24 Utah 2d 128, 
467 P 2d 45, 46 (1970), Jaques v Fammond, 
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P 2d 133, 134 (1963) 
It is well established that the question o f 
proximate cause is generally reserved for the 
jury Godesky v Provo City Corp , 690 P 2d 
541, 544 (Utah 1984), Ostler v Albina Tran 
sfer Co, Inc , 781 P 2d 445, 451 (Utah App 
I 1989), cert denied, 795 P 2d 1138 (Utah 
i 1990) Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule 
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate 
causation 
This principle is illustrated by several Utah 
Supreme Court decisions In Hams v Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P 2d 217 (Utah 1983), 
the passenger of a jeep brought an action 
against a bus company and the jeep dnver for 
injuries sustained in a traffic accident The 
trial court granted the bus company a directed 
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found 
the jeep dnver should have observed the bus 
prior to the accident, they must find, as a 
matter of law, that the jeep dnver was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident On appeal, 
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer 
that the bus negligently contnbuted to the 
accident and pointed to allegations that the 
bus stopped too rapidly, failed to dnve out of 
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights 
Id at 220 The Utah Supreme Court agreed 
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with the plaintiff and reversed the directed 
verdict. The Harris court held it improper for 
the trial judge to have taken the issue of pro-
ximate cause from the jury. The court expla-
ined: "Where the evidence is in dispute inclu-
ding the inferences from the evidence, the 
issue should be submitted to the jury." Id. 
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been 
injured in an automobile accident. The plain-
tiff claimed he was unable to see approaching 
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because 
a van owned by the defendant utility company 
negligently blocked his view by remaining in 
the intersection, and this was an intervening 
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause. The court held that the issue of proxi-
mate cause may only be taken from the jury 
where reasonable minds could not differ as to 
what "was or was not the proximate cause of 
the injury.'' Id. at 365 n.4. The court concl-
uded that "in a situation involving indepen-
dent intervening cause, the primary issue is 
one of the foreseeability of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of a third person, and in 
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must 
be resolved by the finder of fact." Id. at 365 
(emphasis added). 
In Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's summary judgment for 
defendant on the issue of proximate causation 
because the court found no evidence of prox-
imate cause and detennined that, without 
evidence, the issue would have been left to 
juror speculation. In Mitchell, dependents of a 
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful 
death action against the hotel after the dece-
ased had been unexplainedly murdered in his 
hotel room. Plaintiffs sought to prove that the 
hotel management was negligent in its security 
measures and that such negligence proximately 
caused *he murder. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's 
summary judgment for the defendant. The 
court held that because there was no evidence 
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's 
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual 
connection between the negligent security 
measures and the murder. The Mitchell court 
recognized that the murderer could have 
entered the room in a number of ways, many 
of which would have had no connection with 
the hotel's security measures, including by 
invitation of the deceased. Because plaintiffs 
bore the burden to show defendant's conduct 
was a 'substantial causative factor that led to 
the [guest's] dea th / id. at 246, and because 
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than 
mere speculation as to how the murderer got 
in the room, summary judgment on the issue 
of proximate causation was proper. 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should 
be taken from the jury only where: (I) there is 
no evidence to establish a causal connection, 
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or 
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ 
on the inferences to be derived from the evi-
dence on proximate causation. Robertson v. 
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc., 163 Ariz. 539, 
789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc). 
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury because 
there was not an unbroken causal line between 
this failure and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehe-
nding Mr. Burnett, Mr. Burnett's decision to 
run, and Mr. Burnett's physical encounter 
with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of 
law, intervening proximate causes and there-
fore broke the chain of causation flowing 
from its failure to deter. 
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent 
negligent act may break the chain of causation 
and relieve the liability of a prior negligent 
actor under the proper circumstances." 
Godesky, 690 P.2d at 544. However, if the 
subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the 
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes 
and the prior actor is not absolved of liability. 
Id. The issue is whether the subsequent inter-
vening conduct, either criminal or negligent, 
was reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 545; Harris, 
671 P.2d at 220. "A superseding cause, suffi-
cient to become the proximate cause of the 
final result and relieve defendant of liability 
for his original negligence, arises only when an 
intervening force was unforeseeable and may 
be described with the benefit of hindsight, as 
extraordinary." Robertson, 789 P.2d at 1047.2 
The fact that the final act which produces the 
injury is the criminal conduct of a third party 
does not preclude the finding that an earlier 
negligent act was the proximate cause of 
injury if the criminal conduct was, under the 
circumstances, reasonably foreseeable. Robe-
rtson, 789 P.2d at 1047; Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 
246. 
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subseq-
uent acts of negligence to break the chain of 
causation between an earlier act of negligence 
and the injury. Only the unforeseeable acts of 
another constitute an intervening proximate 
cause. See State v. Marty, 166 Ariz. 233, 801 
P.2d 468, 472 (Ct. App. 1990); People v. 
Gentry, 738 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Colo. 1987); Stare 
v. Neher, 52 Wash. App. 298, 759 P.2d 
475, 476 (1988), afPd, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771 
P 2 d 330 (L989). To hold otherwise would 
allow tortfeasors to escape liability by com-
mitting additional acts of negligence following 
an initial breach of a duty. Therefore, Smith's 
apprehension of Mr. Burnett and the subseq-
uent chase through the store did not break the 
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chain of causation. 
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter 
of law, that Mr. Burnett 's acts following 
apprehension broke the chain of causation 
between Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett 
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. Substantial 
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith 
could have reasonably foreseen a customer 
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to 
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the 
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat and 
mouse" with him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen 
presented evidence on this theory of causation. 
A closer question is whether any reasonable 
juror could conclude that the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it show 
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced 
substantial expert testimony that , in dealing 
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent 
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety. 
During trial, Mrs. Steffensen presented testi-
mony from security and shoplifting experts 
who testified that Smith 's employees failed to 
use reasonable means to handle Mr. Burnett, a 
suspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the 
safety of the store's customers. These experts 
identified two specific and generally accepted 
techniques that retail stores employ when 
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith 
failed to implement. First, the experts testified 
that a retail store should take steps to * deter" 
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out bis or 
her plan by taking such affirmative action as 
making direct eye contact with the suspected 
shoplifter, approaching the suspected shopli-
fter and offering assistance, and calling for j 
security over, the public intercom system, j 
Second, the experts testified that a retail store 
should also train its employees to use care 
when apprehending a shoplifter. The experts 
agreed tha t employees should not chase or use 
force with a shoplifter who becomes violent or 
flees. These experts testified that stores 
employ, or should employ, such techniques 
primarily to protect the safety of their custo-
mers and to prevent incidents precisely like the 
one which occurred in this case.3 In addit ion, 
Mrs. Steffensen submitted copies of Smith 's 
employee training manuals which advocated 
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters.4 Mr . 
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought 
Smith 's employees were watching while he was 
in the store. He went to get in the check out 
line and waited there until he believed he was 
not being watched. Further, Mrs . Steffensen's 
experts testified tha t approximate ly five 
percent of all shoplifters, when apprehended, 
run . They likewise testified that the proper use 
of deterrence techniques can reduce this 
number by reducing the number of shoplifters 
as a whole. 
Thus , we are hesitant to uphold the trial 
cour t ' s ruling that , as a matter of law, 
Management Corp. __ 
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Smith 's failure to deter Mr. Burnett was not a 
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. Steffe-
nsen's injury. There was probably sufficient 
evidence produced from which a reasonable 
juror could infer that Smith 's failure to deter 
was a negligent act,5 as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
trained employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer 's injury. 
However, this does not end our inquiry. If 
the trial court ' s partial directed verdict was 
harmless error, we need not reverse. See Utah 
R. Civ. P . 61 (1991); State v. Verde, 770 P 2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). On appeal , the appellant 
has the burden of demonstrating an error was 
prejudicial—that there is a "reasonable hk 
elihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings.* Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 
Further , in determining whether a trial court 's 
error was harmful, we must look beyond the 
mere fact of error and consider in totality all 
the evidence and proceedings below. See, e.g , 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 
1983) (erroneous jury instruction not reversible 
error when considered in light of all instruct-
ions and evidence). Although normally we 
would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous 
directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in 
this case we cannot ignore the fact that the 
ju ry ' s verdict would not have differed had the 
trial judge not granted Smith 's partial directed 
verdict. 
At trial, Mrs . Steffensen presented substa-
ntial evidence of Smith 's negligence: the 
store 's failure to deter Mr . Burnett 's shopli-
fting, the negligent apprehension and holding 
of Mr . Burnett , and the improper pursuit of 
M r . Burnett once he ran for the door . The 
trial cour t ' s partial directed verdict removed 
from the jury ' s consideration only the portion 
of this evidence relating to Smith 's actions 
before Mr. Burnett 's apprehension. In retur-
ning a verdict for the defendant on the rema-
ining evidence, the jury found that although 
Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did 
not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's inj-
uries. Therefore, the jury must have concluded 
that either: (1) the post-apprehension negh-
gence was too at tenuated and remote from the 
injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2) 
Mr. Burnett 's attempt to flee was an unfore-
seeable superseding proximate cause of the 
injury. We cannot see how the jury would 
have reached a different conclusion had it 
been allowed to consider acts Smith perfo-
rmed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehe-
nding Mr. Burnett . Accordingly, we find it 
I highly unlikely the jury would have changed 
j its proximate cause decision had the trial judge 
submitted t o them the issue of Smith 's failure 
to deter Mr . Burnett 's shoplifting. Therefore, 
we find the trial court ' s partial directed 
I verdict o n the issue of proximate causation to be , at most , harmless error . 
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IL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court 
incorrectly stated the law with regard to for-
eseeability when it instructed the jury concer-
ning her second theory of negligence-the 
post-apprehension chase. We review challe-
nges to jury instructions under a "correctness" 
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Manage-
ment Corp., 114 P.2d 1,2 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's jury instruction number 
thirty-two charged the jury that: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a 
customer which the defendant and 
its employees could have reasonably 
anticipated as the natural consequ-
ences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anti-
cipate the particular injury which 
did occur. In determining what is 
foreseeable, you must determine that 
the actions by Burnett were 
predictable by Smith's employees 
and not just a mere possibility. 
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction impr-
operly focused on the particular acts of Mr. 
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in 
general. We agree that the specific identity of 
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of 
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur 
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary 
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's 
claim because any error committed by the trial 
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61 
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989). 
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue 
of negligence, and the jury found Smith neg-
ligent. Therefore, any error in defining fores-
eeability did not affect the jury's verdia. 
ID. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the 
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her 
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade 
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testif-
ying about Smith's employee training practices 
as they related to the way its employees handle 
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not 
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an 
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to 
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of 
expert testimony, are reviewed under a defer-
ential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded 
evidence could have influenced the jury. to 
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 
806 P.2d 744,746 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Testimony On Employee Training 
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court 
should have admitted expert testimony conc-
erning Smith's failure to adequately train its 
employees regarding the proper handling of 
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring 
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit 
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on 
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of the injury, and therefore the testi-
mony was irrelevant. 
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue 
relating to shoplifter "deterrence* mandates a 
finding that if this ruling was error, the error 
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of 
any training evidence relating to Smith's 
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also har-
mless as the jury found Smith negligent in its 
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett. 
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault 
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her 
expert witness should have been allowed to 
render an opinion concerning the relative fault 
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the 
trial court's ruling was correct because the 
apportionment of fault requires the expert to 
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmi-
ssible under Utah law. We agree with Smith 
that the apportionment of fault requires a 
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determi-
nation should be reserved for the jury. 
This court recently considered the question 
of what expert opinions are permissible as 
going to the "ultimate issue,"* and what expert 
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclus-
ions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In 
Davidson, we held the trial court properly 
excluded an expert opinion which concluded 
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so, 
we stated that "[pjuestions which allow a 
witness to simply tell a jury what result to 
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A 
witness may testify as to the defendant's 
actions, including whether the defendant acted 
with care; however, the witness may not con-
sider all the facts and render a final legal 
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault 
between parties to be exactly this type of 
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the 
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative 
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that 
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony 
regarding the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, even if the trial judge impro-
perly invaded the province of the jury by 
granting Smith a partial directed verdia on the 
issue of proximate causation, such error was 
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's 
subsequent negligent acts were not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability" 
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for the jury was rendered harmless -by the 
jury's finding that Smith was negligent. 
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded 
expert testimony which would have improperly 
rendered a legal conclusion as to the propor-
tion of fault betiween Smith and Mr. Burnett. 
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for 
defendant. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Although the trial judge both granted a directed 
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's 
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most 
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict. 
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an 
element of a cause of action, and takes such deter-
mination from the purview of the jury—as was 
done here. The Utah Supreme Court characterized 
the same action of a tnal judge as a directed verdict 
in Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action 
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that if they found that the defe-
ndant jeep driver should have observed the bus, 
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the 
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the col-
lision, thereby precluding liability stemming from 
the bus driver's actions. Id. On appeal, the Utah ' 
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was 
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such. The j 
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable 
from the ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise 
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict 
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos Truc-
king Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the 
sufficiency of the evidence). 
2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah App. 1990Xin wrongful death action, trial 
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on 
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of 
patient's worsening condition was not proximate 
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence). 
3. Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques-
-deterrence and refraining from using force or 
chasing the shoplifter—arc valid security methods. 
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's 
employees had been adequately trained in these 
procedures and properly followed the procedures 
during the Burnett shoplifting incident. , 
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements 
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in han-
dling shoplifters: 
Make sure that employees on the sales 
floor are greeting and making eye 
contact with customers, especially those 
who are acting suspiciously. Make use 
of the intercom system by calling for 
security from time to time. Very effec-
tive tool, it gives the potential shoplifter 
an uneasy feeling that security is in the 
store. 
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its 
employees regarding the importance of customer 
safety in handling shoplifters: 
Our company policy is that no employee 
is to take any action in the apprehension 
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to 
himself, to other employees, or to cust-
omers. The most important thing to 
remember about apprehending a shopl-
ifter is that we do not want anyone 
injured. There is nothing in the store 
that is worth a person getting hurt for. 
Use common sense, if the situation 
can't be properly controlled let the 
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license 
number. 
5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding 
Smith owed Mrs. Steffensen a duty to take reason-
able precautions to protect her from the criminal 
acts of third parties was correct. Since trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shop-
owner's duty to protect customers from the criminal 
acts of third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jew-
elers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In Dwiggins, the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating landowners 
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable 
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of 
third parties where such acts are reasonably forese-
eable. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry 
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a 
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins is 
distinguishable because the store in question was the 
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's 
chain. Further, the fact that Smith's employee 
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters 
demonstrates Smith did, in fact, foresee such crim-
inal acts. Therefore, we believe the trial judge pro-
perly Jound that because customer injury from 
shoplifters was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty 
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its 
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with 
shoplifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 
P.2d 43, 4649 (Colo. 1987)(store owner had a 
duty to take reasonable security measures to protect 
customers where store had been subject of armed 
robbery ten times in past three yearsXrelied on by 
Dwiggins, 811 P.2dat 183 n.l) . 
6. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1991). 
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ADDENDUM C 
EXHIBIT C 
1 I SALT LAKE CITYr UTAH; JANUARY 31, 1990; A. M. SESSION 
2 (REPORTER'S NOTE: The following 
3 proceedings were had in chambers, out 
4 J of the presence of the jury:) 
5 THE COURT: For the record, this is the case of 
6 Pearl H. Steffensen versus Smith Management Corporation. 
7 C-870903662. The record will show we are in chambers, the 
8 I evidence has been concluded; as I understand it the 
9 defendants have some motions. 
10 MR. TOLBOE: The first motion deals with a request 
11 for a directed verdict. The reason that we are asking for 
12 that is pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-11-18. That 
13 I statute as you are aware, provides for immunity from civil 
14 liability as long as three things are met: one being that 
15 the — 
16 THE COURT: Excuse me, 78 what, again? 
17 MR. TOLBOE: 78-11-18. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 MR. TOLBOE: Three things must be met. First, 
20 Smiths has to have reason to believe that merchandise has 
21 been wrongfully taken and that they can recover such 
22 merchandise by taking the individual with the goods into 
23 custody. 
24 Second is that they must take the person into 
25 custody and detain him in a reasonable manner, and third, 
1 must detain him for a reasonable length of time. If those 
2 standards are met, then Smiths cannot be held civilly liable 
3 I for anything arising out of that particular incident. 
4 In this particular situation, it has not been 
5 argued — in fact the facts have proven, and reasonable 
6 minds could not differ, that Smiths indeed had reason to 
7 believe that the person was leaving the store with items 
8 I that he had not paid for. 
9 Number 2, that the detention was reasonable in all 
10 I regards, and number 3, that the length of custody obviously 
11 was not excessive, and I think reasonable minds could not 
12 differ to that issue, and therefore, request that the Court 
13 render a directed verdict. 
14 THE COURT: I think if the plaintiff's evidence 
15 were believed, and particularly if the plaintiff's experts 
16 were believed, the jury could find that the detention was 
17 I unreasonable under all the sections, and I think reasonable 
18 minds could differ. The motion will be denied. 
19 MR. TOLBOE: Okay. 
20 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, I then have a motion for a 
21 directed verdict as to part of the case. This motion would 
22 I pertain to everything that occurred prior to the time that 
23 Smith's employees detained and apprehended Bradley Burnett. 
24 J And that's because of the alleged lack of eye contact, 
25 failure to greet, standing in front of the doors with your 
1 I arms crossed, call for security on the intercom, did not 
2 | proximately cause Pearl Steffensen's injuries. 
3 | Plaintiffs seem to argue that shoplifting per se 
4 | is dangerous, and that's not supported by the facts which 
5 I have come out at trial. Only two out of 100 shoplifters 
6 I run, and none have ever collided with customers, according 
7 I to our experts. 
8 1 It is true that had we not apprehended the 
9 I shoplifter, there would have been no accident, but that's 
10 I dealing seemingly with the "but for" analysis of causation. 
11 I They need to go one step further and show these items 
12 proximately caused the injury. They could not merely show 
13 J that had Bradley Burnett not gotten out of bed that morning, 
14 there would have been no accident. If that's true, that is 
15 the "but for" analysis; had we not apprehended him, had we 
16 used eye contact, had he put the items back, had we let him 
17 through, there would have been no accident that would have 
18 caused her injuries. 
19 They need to show there was some indicia about 
20 I this accident that made Bradly Burnett dangerous, likely to 
21 run, and likely to collide with a customer causing an 
22 injury. There are no facts so indicating. 
23 J Moreover, as Mr. Tolboe indicated, we have a 
24 right, a statutory right to stop and detain. That is clear, 
25 J according to the Utah Code. Moreover, the employees' 
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obligation to their employer to stop employees [sic] and try 
to regain possession of the merchandise which is being 
stolen, but there is an utter lack of causation as to 
everything that occurred prior to the time that the employee 
stopped Bradley Burnett, the shoplifter. 
THE COURT: Which of you are going to respond to 
that? 
MR. PARKER: I will. 
Your Honor, I believe there is trial testimony, 
Bradley Burnett's testimony, that had somebody approached 
him and greeted him, or that when there was eye contact, 
that that did prevent and deter, and that he even would have 
put the beer back. 
Even Smith's expert yesterday said that they 
thought the incident began initially when they saw Bradley 
Burnett and thought he looked suspicious. And the standard 
of care that has been delineated by both our experts, and I 
believe Smith's, is a standard that in — it inherently 
recognizes that when dealing with shoplifters, people can 
get hurt, and so that you deal with them on two levels: 
one, you try and deal on the prevention level, because then 
not only have you protected your goods, but you have 
prevented people — you have prevented that harm, you have 
nipped it right in the bud. And if you then can't do that, 
then the second option is that at that point in time, you 
1 apprehend. But still safety is the most important thing on 
2 your mind. And that's printed right in Smith's own 
3 documents. 
4 The statutory language that they use is language 
5 which talks about the civil liability between a shoplifter 
6 and a store. And it is talking about a shoplifter with 
7 dirty hands or a party where the store has reason to 
8 believe that he has dirty hands, filing an action and with 
9 the store then saying that if it is reasonable and you have 
10 reason to believe he took something, that then he cannot 
11 bring an action. 
12 Now, we're claiming their actions in the whole 
13 were not reasonable. But the testimony has been when you 
14 are dealing with shoplifters, be careful. Even Mr. Cocke, 
15 who was here yesterday, who said expect the worst; prevent 
16 if you can. That prevention, when you don't prevent it, 
17 increases the risk of injury because they are moving into 
18 apprehension and that is increasing that risk of injury that 
19 makes that in a causal case — that is a causal part of the 
20 case. 
21 You know, I think it is clear, that that is part 
22 of a safety rule made to — you are not going to have 
23 problems with 95 percent. I might not say 98 percent. 95 
24 percent. But five percent, when you have all these 
25 customers, let's say you only have 100 every six months. 
1 Five percent risk isn't an acceptable risk, so Smith's says 
2 I use care, prevent first. If you don't prevent when you 
3 apprehend, do it in a safe manner. If it gets out of 
4 control, let them go. It is one big picture. 
5 To bifurcate it and say none of this other counts, 
6 it doesn't have anything to do with safety, that's wrong 
7 here. And our claim is Smith's broke their own safety 
8 J rules, and as a result Pearl is injured. 
9 MR. HANSEN: May I respond, your Honor? 
10 Nothing in the law requires Smith's to use 
11 deterrence. Nothing at all. The Utah Code allows us to 
12 apprehend and detain. That is clear. And as I indicated 
13 before, I would like to know how the alleged lack of eye 
14 J contact, failure to greet, standing in front of the door 
15 with your arms crossed, calling for security on the 
16 intercom, failure to sign off on the shoplifting manual., had 
17 I anything to do with Pearl's injuries. 
18 Shoplifters are not per se dangerous. We are 
19 J talking about petty larceny. They would like the court to 
20 I believe that you ought to prevent shoplifting because there 
21 is something inherently dangerous about shoplifting. Five 
22 J percent do run. But in all of Mr. Cocke's experience, in 
23 all of Mr. Senewald's experience, not one shoplifter has run 
24 I and then injured a customer. It just has never happened 
25 before. 
1 I THE COURT: Well, I am inclined to agree that the 
2 | actions that took place prior to the time that the 
3 | shoplifter was detained couldn't reasonably be found to be 
4 J the proximate cause of the injury, and I think that motion 
5 will be granted, I guess in terms of a partial directed 
6 verdict, or we will have to have a jury instruction. 
7 MR. HANSEN: Could we have a jury instruction on 
8 that, your Honor? 
9 Your Honor, we do have one other motion, if we are 
10 finished with this motion which has just been ruled upon. 
11 THE COURT: We are. 
12 MR. HANSEN: That is, we would like the court to 
13 rule that reasonable minds could not differ that Bradley 
14 Burnett was negligent as a matter of law, or that he 
15 intentionally collided with Pearl Steffensen. 
16 THE COURT: He certainly didn't intentionally 
17 collide with Pearl Steffensen. There is no indication that 
18 J he intentionally collided with her. 
19 MR. HANSEN: We simply do not believe that 
20 reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not he was 
21 negligent. 
22 THE COURT: I think we will let the jury determine 
23 that. I tend to agree. I don't see how you could come to 
24 any other conclusion, but that he was negligent. I think 
25 I that would be evident for the injury. If they come back and 
1 say he is zero percent negligent, I guess we will deal with 
2 that at that time, but I just don't foresee that as a 
3 possibility of some cause of action, 
4 MR. PARKER: Can I ask a question with regard 
5 to the ruling you just made? I don't know how that impacts 
6 the case. Our theory of the case is that Smith's didn't use 
7 safety first. And that was the most important in their 
8 J minds. One of the issues in this case is they didn't use 
9 safety first because they didn't deter and prevent. It was 
10 a deterrent mode. It was a catch him mode, not safety 
11 first, prevention, and then catch him. So what does this do 
12 to arguing the case? 
13 THE COURT: I am not going to let you argue that. 
14 You can argue that anything they did after the time that 
15 they detained him was cause, for example not signing the 
16 document, not signing the — 
17 j MR. PARKER: I am not going to argue that, but the 
18 eye contact rule, the greeting rule, all of that stuff, that 
19 would keep it from happening in the first place, keep the 
20 incident of shoplifters low — 
21 MR. HANSEN: That's "but for." 
22 j THE COURT: I am not going to let you argue that. 
23 | Signing the document is an — it is an example. It is 
24 | no proximate cause. And the other things are similar; 
25 I they're not quite as clear. 
1 Okay. Are there any other motions before we do 
2 our jury instructions? 
3 MR. TOLBOE: No, sir, I don't believe so. 
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